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What determines a country’s bargaining success when negotiating EU legislation? Using data
from legislative proposals negotiated between 2004 and 2008, James P. Cross assesses the
impact that direct intervention in the decision-making process has on outcomes. He finds that
those states which voice disagreement over Commission proposals most often tend to have
the least bargaining success.
A number of  recent EUROPP contributions have considered the dif f erent f actors that
determine the winners and losers in legislative negotiations in the EU. Jonathan Golub
considered member state bargaining success and argued that smaller states do comparatively better than
larger states. Stuart A. Brown argued that the success of  smaller member states in af f ecting the
negotiation process might be because they take posit ions closer to potential winners in the f irst place.
Neither author considers the actual process of  negotiation itself , which starts with the init ial posit ions of
member states, and ends with f inal policy outcomes. This intermediate stage of  negotiations is key in
determining legislative outputs, as it is exactly when member states can argue f or their policy posit ions in
attempts to af f ect policy outcomes in their f avour. To be f air to both authors, they do not have the data
necessary to examine this stage of  the negotiation process, but caref ul consideration of  negotiator
activit ies during the negotiation process is none the less required to f ully understand who wins and who
loses in EU negotiations. This post aims to add to the debate surrounding winners and losers in the
Council by considering whether member states can actively af f ect their bargaining success through direct
intervention during the negotiation process.
My own research uncovers how negotiators behave during negotiations. I combine data on member states’
init ial posit ions and f inal policy outcomes with a measure of  the amount of  interventions each member
state makes over the course of  negotiations. An intervention is def ined as any explicit statement of
disagreement with the Commission proposal at a particular point in the legislative process. These
interventions are made by a member state at of f icial meetings in Council working groups and in the
Committee of  Permanent Representatives (COREPER) over the course of  negotiations f or a particular
proposal. They are important, as they act as a signal to other negotiators that a member state is
dissatisf ied with a particular part of  the proposal and would like to see it changed.
Figure 1 shows the total number of  interventions made by each member state at the working group and
COREPER levels within the Council f or 16 legislative proposals decided upon between 2004 and 2008. Two
things stand out here. Firstly, larger member states tend to intervene more than smaller member states.
This more assertive behaviour is perhaps not surprising, given that larger member states will usually
represent a larger cross section of  domestic interests. Secondly, there seems to be a divide between older
and newer member states, with those member states that joined the EU in the 2004 enlargement
intervening less than older member states. This might be due to the f act that newer member states were
f inding their f eet in the Council f ollowing the 2004 accession, and thus tended to intervene less.
Figure 1: Mean number of interventions at the Working Group and COREPER levels of negotiation
Source: Cross, J.P. (2012). Interventions and negotiat ion in the Council of  Ministers of  the
European Union. European Union Politics 13(1): 47–69.
While it is clear f rom f igure 1 that larger and older member states are more active than smaller and newer
member states during legislative negotiations, a more important question is whether this intervention
activity translates into legislative inf luence. Interventions might posit ively inf luence negotiations in f avour
of  the intervenor, by inf luencing other member states to change their posit ion and thus change the f inal
outcome in the intervenor ’s f avour. On the other hand, interventions might be better characterised as a
signal of  dissatisf action over the direction in which negotiations are headed, and are made when a member
state sees thing are not going in their f avour. Both interpretations of  intervention behaviour are plausible,
but we need to consider the relationship between interventions and legislative bargaining success to
determine which more accurately describes their role in the negotiation process.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the number of  interventions made by a member state over the
course of  negotiations and that member state’s bargaining success. An increase in the distance between a
member state’s init ial posit ion and the f inal outcome (y-axis) represents a decrease in bargaining success.
As can be seen, there is a posit ive relationship between interventions and a member state’s distance f rom
the outcome, suggesting that a member state that makes more interventions tends to have less bargaining
success, and that interventions are a signal of  discontent expressed by member states when negotiations
are not going in their f avour.
Figure 2: The relationship between interventions and member state bargaining success
Source: Cross, J. P. (2012). Everyone’s a winner (almost): Bargaining success in the Council
of  Ministers of  the European Union. European Union Politics. 14(1) 70-94.
Some might see this as a surprising f inding. The idea that more interventions imply less legislative
bargaining success suggests that changing legislation through direct intervention is dif f icult. This in turn
suggests that of f icial Council meetings might be litt le more than a place where member states can register
their discontent about expected policy outcomes, and the real negotiation determining legislative outcomes
occur elsewhere. Indeed, when one watches the webcasts of  Council meetings online, one gets the
impression that negotiators are reading out pre-prepared statements rather than actually engaging in
negotiation.
On the other hand, even if  these of f icial meetings represent a f orum to publically state opposition to
legislation through pre-prepared statements, this process itself  can aid in holding decision makers to
account. The f act that some public access is allowed to meeting records allows the public to monitor
governments at the EU level. This potential f or accountability is seen by many (but not all) as a good thing,
and could in t ime lead to a more equal distribution of  bargaining success across member states.
It is clear that f urther research into the manner that member states seek to inf luence legislative negotiation
during the negotiation process is needed. A caref ul look at the content of  interventions and their t iming is
appropriate, as the evidence discussed above does not account f or these aspects of  intervention
behaviour. For instance, interventions relating to budget matters, sovereignty, and other salient issues are
likely to have more inf luence than those relating to more technical issues. Similarly, one would expect that
interventions made at the beginning of  negotiations bef ore consensus begins to f orm will probably be
more inf luential than those made af ter signif icant progress towards agreement has been made. The above
research represents a f irst step at uncovering these f actors, but considerable work remains to be done.
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